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IV. Darwinian Selection and the World of Art
John Hay
PLOTTING DEVICES: LITERARY DARWINISM IN THE 
LABORATORY
Abstract. Critics of literary Darwinism like to point out the weaknesses 
of its scientific scaffolding, but the real flaw in this research program 
is its neglect of literary history and stylistic evolution. A full-fledged 
scientific approach to literary criticism should incorporate the kind of 
work being done by Franco Moretti at the Stanford Literary Lab—a 
quantitative analysis of the history of literary form. While Moretti and 
the literary Darwinists are almost never mentioned together, I contend 
that their work is not only compatible but also necessarily so for a more 
consilient literary criticism. The Darwinian aesthetics promoted by Denis 
Dutton can help to unite these two approaches.
“Why is George Wickham such a jerk?” This is usually considered the wrong kind of question to ask in a literature class. The 
professor might respond with a reminder that Wickham is not a real 
person but rather a fictional character in Pride and Prejudice, his actions 
thus governed, not by underlying psychological properties, but by their 
function in a novel’s plot. Yet critics have begun to approach such ques-
tions with fresh minds, treating literary characters as case studies in the 
effort to understand the science of human nature. Evolutionary liter-
ary criticism—or literary Darwinism, as it has most popularly become 
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known—is a field of inquiry led by Joseph Carroll, Brian Boyd, and 
Jonathan Gottschall that allows critics to analyze stories in terms of 
evolved human characteristics.1 Wickham’s caddish behavior can be 
understood not only as part of Jane Austen’s narrative construction but 
also in terms of a biologically evolved mating strategy.
Literary Darwinism has rapidly grown in popularity and branched into 
the arts more generally; the most widely read and reviewed publication 
associated with the movement is The Art Instinct by Denis Dutton, who 
also played an important editorial role in developing this new criticism.2 
Nevertheless, literary Darwinism has faced both severe skepticism and 
outright condemnation. The loudest complaint voiced against this new 
avenue of criticism challenges its scientific accuracy. Jonathan Kramnick, 
for example, insists that the psychological theories upon which literary 
Darwinism rests are heavily suspect and by no means matters of con-
sensus within the scientific community.3 
I argue that such a critique is misguided; literary Darwinism’s greatest 
flaw is its faulty approach to stylistic evolution and literary history due to 
a heavy reliance on psychological principles. Pride and Prejudice can teach 
us about universal traits of human social behavior, but it can also teach us 
about cultural norms and literary expression in early nineteenth-century 
England. Rather than reject Darwinian literary criticism for its shortcom-
ings, this essay advocates its union with a separate scientific approach 
to literature taken from the work of Franco Moretti. While Moretti is 
rarely linked with the literary Darwinists, I contend that his focus on 
the history and migration of literary genres and devices expands and 
improves an evolutionary view of characters, plots, and settings. Taken 
together, these critical methodologies form a more comprehensive, 
empirical mode of inquiry that could appeal to a wide array of scholars.
I
Literary Darwinists have a focused set of concerns and a clear agenda. 
The movement owes its origins largely to the “science wars” of the 1990s. 
Disconcerted by the prevalence of postmodern declarations that chal-
lenged the validity of modern science, some literary critics began insisting 
that contemporary research in biology and psychology could provide 
an accurate understanding of an essentially universal “human nature.” 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, building on Edward Wilson’s ground-
breaking work in sociobiology, laid the foundations for such knowledge 
with their program of evolutionary psychology.4 Led by Joseph Carroll, 
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a small but vocal minority of literature professors banded together to 
form a literature-and-science research project that rejects much of the 
work dominant in literary scholarship for the past thirty years and favors 
a more scientific approach for literary study (incorporating quantifiable 
analyses, data charts, falsifiable theories, etc.). Reacting to scholarship 
that focuses on gender, racial, and ethnic differences, literary Darwinists 
argue that evolutionary psychology offers models of human nature 
equally and universally applicable to all cultures and literatures.
The movement began with polemical attacks against the widespread 
approval of Marx and Freud, whose ideas have remained far more cur-
rent in the humanities than in the sciences. In a very basic sense, as 
Gottschall has pointed out, literary Darwinists seek to replace literary 
criticism based on Freudian psychoanalytic principles with criticism based 
on the more recent (and likely more accurate) theories of evolutionary 
psychology.5 For those who feel that literature departments have become 
too dependent on recognizably outdated and falsified theories from the 
social sciences, evolutionary literary theory may seem to offer a fresh 
sense of theoretical progress. Yet literary Darwinists claim to provide 
more than incremental improvement. Carroll rejects the idea that 
literary Darwinism will become simply another accepted paradigm for 
literary scholarship (alongside Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis, and 
deconstruction), instead insisting that a revolution is required in the 
humanities—a revolution that will feature Darwinism at the center of 
intellectual pursuits.6 Carroll claims that evolutionary literary theory is 
essentially totalizing in scope and thus neither compatible nor commen-
surable with other understandings of humanity and human production. 
In one sense, Carroll is right: literary Darwinism cannot be “merged” 
with other totalizing outlooks on humanity in the same way that a 
Marxian explanation of history can complement a Lacanian description 
of desire. Carroll rejects these other paradigms of literary scholarship 
specifically because they present, whether implicitly or explicitly, views 
of humanity in conflict with the Darwinian perspective; but there is 
no reason to presume that literary Darwinism would be incompatible 
with critical paradigms in the humanities that do not entail a specific 
view on humanity itself. So, for example, a literary scholar advocating 
a Darwinian account of human and cultural origins could very well 
prefer a linguistic analysis of a novel to an examination of that novel’s 
historical reception (or vice versa).
The call for greater consilience with the natural sciences may be 
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attractive to many scholars, but potential adherents could be discouraged 
by the radically new professional aims of evolutionary literary theory. 
With the important exception of Brian Boyd’s recent book Why Lyrics 
Last, which offers readings of Shakespeare’s sonnets, Carroll, Boyd, 
and Gottschall have primarily addressed narrative rather than poetic 
aspects of literature. Carroll has argued that the key objects of interest 
for evolutionary literary study are the “dramatic” elements of character, 
plot, and setting—a view reinforced by Boyd, who aims to isolate “story” 
from any overall text.7 (Boyd is thus equally comfortable working with 
the Odyssey and Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who! since, regardless of form, 
each tells a story.) While the focus on story rather than style potentially 
constitutes a severe limitation, its major benefit is its global applicability 
in the domain of world literature. Just as human nature is universal, the 
argument goes, so too are aspects of human stories.
The focus on storytelling leads to some interesting new questions: 
Why do we like stories? What use do they have? Why are some stories 
more popular than others? But in seeking answers to these questions 
by appealing to evolutionary psychology, literary Darwinists sometimes 
take human nature, rather than the literary text itself, as their ultimate 
object of inquiry. The result can feel bizarre; for example, Boyd remarks 
that Joyce’s Ulysses is indebted to the multidimensional character created 
by Homer, but he fails to mention anything about the formal aspects 
of Joyce’s modernist novel.8 History and language (often expressed as 
changes in form and style) have been tremendously important to the 
professional study of literature over the past hundred years, and the 
evolutionary critics give them short shrift. Human nature, they argue, 
has changed little in the past ten thousand years. In the works of liter-
ary Darwinists, historical and cultural developments are not nearly as 
significant as the shared, universal traits of human nature formed in 
the Pleistocene epoch—traits like aggression, mating strategy, and social 
behavior, which can be revealed by psychological readings of popular 
stories.
The neglect of human history is an extreme step for literary pro-
fessionals (even for those nostalgic for the preeminence of the New 
Criticism). The humanities have distinguished themselves from the sci-
ences by paying attention to the particular rather than the general and 
by retaining a sense of academic tradition rather than relying exclusively 
on current theories. The literary Darwinists’ rejection of cultural his-
tory is so extreme, in fact, that it fails to find support even from some 
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of the scientists who provided the foundation for the movement. Both 
Edward Wilson and Richard Dawkins (often cited in evolutionary literary 
criticism) have advocated the documentation of small, rapid changes 
in cultural developments in addition to the genetic and behavioral ele-
ments of universal human nature. Yet literary Darwinists have largely 
refused to consider this avenue of research.
This line of cultural-historical inquiry commonly centers on the 
“meme,” a term coined by Dawkins.9 Analogous to genes, memes 
are fundamental units of culture that spread through a population 
and persist through time and, occasionally, across cultures. Examples 
include melodies, clothing styles, and theological beliefs. Wilson also 
promoted a term for a similar unit: the “culturgen.” While “meme” 
refers to cultural elements themselves, “culturgen” signifies the neural 
arrangement that indicates the phenomena in the mind.10 Thus the 
meme is purely cultural (i.e., nongenetic), while the culturgen allows 
for gene-culture coevolution. Wilson has since conceded the greater 
popularity of Dawkins’s term while suggesting that we should understand 
“meme” as denoting simultaneously the abstract cultural idea and its 
respective node of semantic memory in the brain.11 In this modified 
form that forges a stronger link between neuroscience and semiotics, 
Wilson recognized the legitimacy of the meme in his foreword to the 
literary Darwinist anthology The Literary Animal.12
The main criticism lobbied against the meme has been the difficulty 
of establishing its existence “in nature.” Its ontological status has been 
subject to uncertainty as it cannot be reduced to physical components; 
thus both Carroll and Boyd dismiss the meme as a troublesome meta-
phor.13 But Wilson’s intervention grounds the concept and retains its 
use for the humanities. Memes allow scholars to move beyond indi-
vidual artists and texts in order to identify trends, patterns, and—most 
important—historical developments. Unlike genes, memes are not 
autonomous self-replicators and thus are not subject to the process of 
natural selection. However, literary genres and devices do evolve over 
time, if not in a Darwinian fashion. Literary Darwinists have too hastily 
dismissed memes as nongenetic metaphors clouding a deeper genetic 
reality. I am insisting that attention to cultural units can enhance rather 
than hinder the study of the arts under a rational, scientific worldview 
that treats human culture as biological product.
While Dawkins’s “memetics” generated a fair deal of controversy and 
attention, the concept of an evolutionary cultural unit is by no means 
a recent suggestion. Arthur Lovejoy, for instance, almost a hundred 
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years ago began encouraging scholars to consider the history of ideas, 
claiming that, due to the persistence of specific “unit-ideas,” philosophi-
cal systems were best studied as stable patterns of basic components 
rather than as original ideas in themselves. Furthermore, Lovejoy, like 
the literary Darwinists, maintained that literature could be studied as 
an activity that is global and universal in scope: “As soon as the histori-
cal study of literature is conceived as a thorough investigation of any 
causal process—even the comparatively trivial one of the migration of 
stories—it must inevitably disregard national and linguistic boundary 
lines.”14 Attention to cultural units thus, for Lovejoy, led to a clearer 
vision of the history of a universal humanity.
One of the most prominent advocates of the cultural unit today is 
Franco Moretti, whose work has explored the migration of literary 
devices and genres across languages and historical eras. Moretti has 
embraced an evolutionary outlook on literature, claiming that evolution-
ary “trees” can be used to trace phenomena such as the development 
of the detective novel.15 Like the literary Darwinists, Moretti not only 
appeals to an evolutionary explanatory system but also urges scholars 
in literature departments to adopt an empirical methodology, arguing 
that professional work should include collecting quantifiable data, pro-
posing falsifiable theories, and testing those theories experimentally. At 
the Stanford Literary Lab, Moretti encourages collaborative work on 
projects that address issues such as whether literary genres might be 
recognizable on a linguistic level by computer-generated algorithms.16 
Such work embraces the literary Darwinists’ call for greater scientific 
respectability, albeit in a separate dimension of scholarship.
II
Moretti has suggested that we need to acknowledge two entirely differ-
ent perspectives in the study of literature, one on plot and one on style. 
He notes that in the arena of world literature plots “travel” incredibly 
well, maintaining recognizable identities when reproduced across lan-
guages, cultures, and times. Style, however, is inherently a local property; 
it often translates poorly between languages, and stylistic conventions are 
historically variable. (Thus Shakespeare’s plots, themselves borrowed, are 
continually adapted into new movies, while his dialogue often frustrates 
high school students.) Despite their potential for complementarity, plot 
and style, argues Moretti, are essentially independent of each other.17 
We can therefore speak of an ahistorical, fundamental human nature 
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when analyzing plots (and characters and settings), but we should pay 
attention to the vagaries of history and language when analyzing how 
plot is expressed through style and form.
Moretti’s approach to the study of literature differs greatly from that 
of the literary Darwinists. While both advocate the professional adoption 
of scientific standards for research, the similarities cease there. Moretti’s 
attention to genres and devices often comes at the expense of attention 
to particular works. His “distant readings” take under their purview the 
literature of multiple nations and eras—tracking, for example, how the 
form of the bildungsroman evolves as it moves from eighteenth-century 
Germany to nineteenth-century France to twentieth-century China—
while single-author studies and close readings of individual works fade 
into the background.18 Human psychology, the foundation of literary 
Darwinism, barely factors into Moretti’s investigations.
However, I contend that Moretti’s scientific approach to literary history 
is a necessary complement to the scientific study of stories promoted by 
literary Darwinists—necessary, because the main flaw with evolutionary 
literary criticism is its restriction to the evaluation of human behavior. 
Such criticism is usually confined to an analysis of characters within nar-
ratives, and when it expands beyond narrative it usually addresses the 
actions and motives of authors and readers; it rarely attends to text as an 
entity in itself with a history of its own. Attacks upon literary Darwinism 
thus often consist chiefly of refutations of the tenets of evolutionary 
psychology on which literary Darwinism is based. Yet such attacks are 
ultimately fruitless, for two main reasons. 
First, the attempt to expose literary Darwinism as an inaccurate 
theory nevertheless recognizes its belonging to scientific discourse. The 
evolutionary literary critics have been candid in their admission that 
their claims are not uttered as hard truths but rather as hypotheses and 
theories subject to refutation and falsification. They expect that their 
theories will not persist as authoritative statements but will rather be 
replaced by more accurate accounts. (Indeed, they sometimes invite 
critiques of their theories as an important part of the scientific activity 
they are promoting.) Second, evolutionary psychology and the literary 
Darwinism developed from it are not particular scientific theories in 
themselves. They are instead what philosopher Imre Lakatos termed 
“research programs,” a term Boyd has embraced.19 A research program 
is more premise than conclusion; it is a postulated perspective on the 
world that guides the path of future research. The evolutionary psychol-
ogy promoted by literary Darwinists is just such a program. Gottschall, 
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for one, insists that the premise on which evolutionary literary criticism 
is based is not a detailed theory regarding neural functioning but the 
simple idea that “psychology evolved.”20 Speculative accounts of species 
development in the Pleistocene are easy to challenge, but it is difficult 
to maintain that the human mind does not result (at least indirectly) 
from natural selection.
As a research program for an academic field in the humanities, how-
ever, literary Darwinism offers very limited prospects. The questions it 
poses (such as, “Why do we like stories about powerful characters?”) are 
interesting but primarily psychological in nature; literature is here often 
a tool for studying the mind rather than the object of inquiry itself. To 
the extent that literary Darwinism generates new perspectives on the 
literary, they are usually constrained either to narrative (i.e., characters, 
plots, and settings) or to author-reader relationships. In this fashion, 
evolutionary literary criticism fits into an older tradition of exclusive 
attention to narrative, a tradition that has featured critics like Vladimir 
Propp and Joseph Campbell. This tradition cannot stand alone. A fuller 
evolutionary approach to literature, one that eclipses postmodern trends 
in order to gain scientific respectability for literature departments, will 
include a more historically attuned (rather than purely universal) focus 
on the evolution of literary form, the kind of focus being championed 
by Franco Moretti and the Stanford Literary Lab.
It is perhaps not surprising that Carroll, Boyd, and other evolutionary 
literary critics have not embraced Moretti’s work. In fact, neither Carroll 
nor Boyd has discussed his work at all (and Gottschall mentions it only 
in passing). The professional attitudes of the literary Darwinists are 
decidedly anti-Marxist, and Moretti’s intellectual trajectory aligns with 
Marxist criticism. But these two Darwinian approaches to literary study 
are compatible. While an understanding of human nature helps us to 
explain aspects of literature as human artifact, we can also profit from 
viewing literature itself as an entity with its own history and evolution. 
Moretti’s approach allows us to appreciate the subtle changes literature 
undergoes in its own development, changes too small to be attributable 
to genetic modifications of human nature itself.
Most professors in the humanities understand their work in some 
relation to either historical periodization or genre study (or both), 
aspects largely undervalued within the literary Darwinist research pro-
gram. Moretti’s emphases on distant reading and quantitative analysis 
are unusual for the profession, but his work maintains a foundation in 
history and form. In fact, by tracing genres and devices historically, his 
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model is an attempt to combine both historicism and formalism. He 
achieves this combination by claiming for literary research an empirical 
methodology, which must certainly be attractive to literary Darwinists. If 
Moretti’s work can be reconciled with theirs, then we can understand 
literary Darwinism as changing the direction of literary research rather 
than simply adding another critical option or, on the other hand, 
effecting a gestalt change within the profession. A greater emphasis 
on Moretti’s aims can still satisfy most of the aims of the evolutionary 
literary critics (the need for theories, data, falsification, comparisons 
across world literature, etc.). Moreover, this conciliation could make a 
more scientific approach to the study of literature more attractive to 
more scholars.
III
We can judge the benefit of augmenting literary Darwinism with 
Moretti’s approach by examining some proposed models for an expla-
nation of the literary stylistic phenomenon known as free indirect 
discourse, a strange blend of impersonal narration and a character’s 
speech or thoughts.
Joseph Carroll and Brian Boyd tend to focus far more on story than 
on style; reference to free indirect discourse in their works is fleeting. 
This paucity of discussion is surprising because they devote so much 
attention to the novels of Jane Austen, arguably the first Western author 
to really develop this stylistic device. (Carroll and Boyd’s interest primar-
ily lies in courtship rather than style in Austen’s work.) In an essay on 
Austen, Boyd limits his discussion of free indirect discourse to a single 
paragraph, explaining that Austen was the first to use the device exten-
sively, which, he says, functions as part of a “cheater detection” system: 
characters in her novels (like human beings everywhere) need to closely 
observe and monitor both themselves and others in order to be able to 
predict future actions and prepare for future situations.21 Free indirect 
discourse, for Boyd, simply represents a kind of mindreading that gets 
to the heart of the observational behavior of evolved human sociality.
Blakey Vermeule offers a promising account of free indirect discourse 
in Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?, a book that links the dis-
semination of literature to socially evolved forms of gossip.22 She initially 
claims that free indirect discourse operates like a meme in literary history, 
and she references Moretti’s work, but then she refocuses her discussion 
on human nature. Vermeule skirts around the historical development 
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of free indirect discourse; she begins with the technique in Chaucer’s 
work, then acknowledges its appearance in works of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, seemingly proposing that it is a 
universal element. But then she claims that Jane Austen more or less 
created the technique and that Henry James perfected it, thus charac-
terizing free indirect discourse as a nineteenth-century phenomenon. 
Vermeule is basically interested in the idea of authors representing 
“mind-reading” (as is Boyd), but she offers no reason why free indirect 
discourse develops in the odd way that it did (WDW, p. 75). Why does 
it only become popular in the nineteenth century? Why does it vary so 
much under the pens of different authors?
Vermeule’s analysis remains limited because she wants to explain free 
indirect discourse, in its relation to human nature, as a unitary and 
universal phenomenon. She offers it as “a technique for presenting a 
character’s thoughts from a third-person point of view,” which is not 
an exclusive quality; regular indirect discourse can do the same thing 
(WDW, p. 75). Using Flaubert’s Madame Bovary as her primary example, 
she describes free indirect discourse as “a vehicle for bearing an emo-
tional tone . . . a tone of egotistical self-assertion” (p. 78). In this case, 
the device is a subtle way to register petty complaints. But this is a very 
idiosyncratic view of the technique—one that applies well to Madame 
Bovary, but not as well to Flaubert’s A Sentimental Education, or to García 
Márquez’s The General in His Labyrinth.
Moretti echoes Vermeule’s ideas about gossip and socialization. Also 
examining the work of Austen and Flaubert, he claims that free indi-
rect discourse is a turn away from the didactic tone that allows for the 
appearance of a third voice (between narrator and character), the voice 
of the “well-socialized individual,” or of public opinion itself.23 Rather 
than grounding free indirect discourse as a natural outgrowth of a single 
biological impulse, Moretti historicizes the technique by claiming that 
it works, in the nineteenth century, to convey a tone of optimistic con-
servatism, a postrevolutionary acceptance of the status quo. However, 
Moretti also allows us to question why free indirect discourse changes 
when used by different authors. Human nature may be uniform, but 
free indirect discourse is not. And while Moretti agrees that free indirect 
discourse is potentially universal in scope—a technique not indigenous 
to one national literature but instead a part of world literature—he 
also attends to the ways in which free indirect discourse evolves when 
presented in different contexts. For example, when literary modernists 
like Marcel Proust and Virginia Woolf pick up the device, it often blends 
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into stream-of-consciousness narration. Moretti’s historical analysis and 
his reflections on socialization are indebted to a Marxist strain of liter-
ary criticism for which literary Darwinists have clearly expressed their 
distaste. Yet what matters in this case is not really an argument about 
human society but rather an argument about the relationship between 
literary form and literary history. Literary Darwinists could certainly agree 
with the idea that free indirect discourse takes on different shapes over 
time—even though they may disagree with Moretti about why it changes.
IV
Denis Dutton’s work can help bridge the gap between Moretti and 
the literary Darwinists. While Dutton devoted one chapter of The Art 
Instinct explicitly to literature as storytelling (primarily adopting Carroll’s 
perspective), his broader interest in the arts allowed him to focus on 
non-narrative types of expression. Moving beyond characters, plots, and 
settings, Dutton recognized style (i.e., the generic rules governing form 
and composition) and tradition as universally essential features of art 
that nevertheless display mutability. Changes in artistic style, he noted, 
“involve borrowing and sudden alteration, as well as slow evolution” 
(AI, p. 53). Artists generate novelty by negotiating prior influences and 
formal constraints, always working within historically variable stylistic 
and cultural frameworks. Originality and creativity, artistic qualities 
valued cross-culturally, arise from challenges to the stability of these 
background frameworks. The critical treatment of style, of course, is 
not completely absent from the works of literary Darwinists, but adher-
ents tend to approach style in terms of universal characteristics and 
individual idiosyncrasies, diagnosing genre in terms of anatomy rather 
than analyzing its historical development.
Dutton, noting that the significance of an artwork is partly determined 
by its place in a tradition, argued that a full aesthetic analysis must 
consider “lines of historical precedents” (AI, p. 58). It simply makes a 
difference whether an image was painted in the thirteenth century or 
the nineteenth century; we continue to ascribe greater value to works 
that were bold in their time, like Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon, even 
if (and indeed, often because) imitations and reproductions later became 
commonplace. The historical precedents shaping an artistic tradition 
may follow global migrations, as artists may choose to enter a tradition 
foreign to their immediate cultural context (as, for example, British pop 
musicians of the 1960s playing American rhythm and blues). Because 
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authors often construct their stories with acknowledged influences from 
other writers, attention to the translation and adaptability of literary 
traditions complements any analysis of human nature’s influence on nar-
rative content. Dutton’s recognition that style itself evolves in a historical 
context—indeed, his overall attention to non-narrative art forms—can 
link the work of literary Darwinists to the labor at Moretti’s literary lab.
Dutton accounted for the origin and evolution of the arts largely by 
appealing to sexual rather than natural selection. In this view, the instinct 
toward artistic creativity is a genetic, species-wide adaptation, but the 
evolution of different genres and traditions results from competitive 
environments that reward individual skills (AI, p. 226). Formal design is 
thus subject to local and individual malleability. Within the structure of 
a genre, individual competition for the greater attention of an audience 
can also be understood as a kind of “problem solving,” which is exactly 
how Boyd describes the historical evolution of newspaper comics in the 
United States.24 By tracing the developments of devices like the speech 
balloon, Boyd calls attention to the trajectory of an artistic tradition, 
performing the kind of cultural work Dutton found so important for 
the arts. Boyd has continued to move in this direction with work on 
verse, particularly Shakespeare’s sonnets, which he is willing to analyze 
in terms of the sonnet form as a formal “tradition.”25 This move beyond 
purely narrative content suggests a promising growth in the critical 
power of literary Darwinism.
Boyd has also called for a “consilient pluralism” that can approach 
“literature as literature, as art, with all the expertise of human readers, 
scholarship and traditions and where appropriate with all the power 
of scientific method.”26 In other words, evolutionary criticism need 
not follow a reductionist program that treats literature merely as the 
product of human psychology; a rich literary history of its own can be 
retained. As few artistic traditions and stylistic techniques are truly uni-
versal throughout human history, being rather the result of cultivation 
and transplantation, a study focusing on genres and devices demands 
a certain attention to the particular iterations of literary phenomena 
within a historical context—an ecological sense of literary form. The 
union of literary Darwinism and Moretti’s methodology produces a 
scholarly outlook that encompasses both a psychological and a histori-
cal approach to story and style. 
Literary Darwinism can provide us with an understanding of the 
human psychological traits that ultimately serve as both a foundation 
and a shaping force for narratives; for an understanding of how stories 
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change—over time and across cultures—particularly in the way they are 
told, we can use quantitative analyses to test theories unique to literary 
history. Literary Darwinism has done much to uncover the origin of 
stories; by following Dutton to Moretti, the movement can continue to 
explore the migration of stories.
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